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The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, is arguably the 
most durable and successful regional grouping in the developing world. Established 
in 1967, it has contributed greatly to regional harmony and prosperity. ASEAN is 
characterized by great internal diversity, generally high economic growth, and a 
reluctance to establish a strong supranational structure. Beginning in 1976—with its 
five original members—ASEAN began to move toward economic cooperation and 
integration, initially with a focus on merchandise trade. In the 1990s, it added focus 
on services, investment, and labor. And in the past decade—now including all of 
Southeast Asia—ASEAN broadened cooperation on macroeconomic and financial 
issues, many of these together with its Northeast Asian neighbors—the “Plus 3” of 
the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Members adopted 
what may appear to be formal preferential trade arrangements. But in practice these 
are usually multilateralized. ASEAN informally embraces what is sometimes termed 
“open regionalism.” However, there is little likelihood in the foreseeable future that 
this will evolve into a deep EU-style economic integration behind a common external 
trade regime, despite a commitment to forming an ASEAN Economic Community 
beginning 2015.   
 
 
Keywords:  ASEAN economies, ASEAN economic development, economic 
integration, regional trade agreements 
 
JEL Classification: F15, F59, O53 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, was established in 
August 1967. It is arguably the most durable and successful regional association in 
the developing world. In a region that had been plagued by conflict and divided by a 
diverse colonial past, ASEAN has first and foremost forged diplomatic cohesion 
among its population of almost 600 million people. Formed initially by leaders of five 
member countries,
1 the 1967 Bangkok Declaration was broad and general in its 
seven objectives. These included, among others 
 
To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region … To promote regional peace and stability… 
To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance … in the 
economic, social, cultural, technical, and administrative spheres. 
 
Subsequently, it has evolved into a close-knit group holding around 700 meetings 
each year on economic, political, cultural, educational, and security matters. ASEAN 
has also been able to effectively project itself regionally and internationally through a 
wide range of initiatives. 
 
Four broad characteristics define ASEAN.  
 
First, it is a region of great diversity, probably more so than any other group in the 
world. Indeed, its economic, political, cultural, and linguistic diversity is greater than 
that of the European Union, for example. This diversity was accentuated by colonial 
experiences, with Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore part of the 
British empire; Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), and 
Viet Nam annexed by the French; Indonesia ruled by the Dutch; the Philippines 
under first Spanish then American rule; while Thailand was never formally colonized.
2 
Political structures are equally diverse, including freewheeling democracies 
(Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines), communist states (Lao PDR and Viet Nam), a 
constitutional democracy with a highly influential monarchy (Thailand), heavily 
managed democracies with one party in continuous rule since independence 
(Malaysia and Singapore), a military-dominated authoritarian state (Myanmar), and 
an all-powerful sultanate (Brunei Darussalam). 
 
ASEAN includes one very wealthy nation (Singapore) alongside some of the world’s 
poorest. The per capita income of the richest is about 80 times that of the 
(imperfectly measured) poorest. It includes the world’s two largest archipelagic states 
(Indonesia and the Philippines) together with Singapore’s city-state, and the tiny oil 
sultanate of Brunei Darussalam. It includes the world’s fourth most populous nation 
(Indonesia), three states with populations between 60 and 90 million people 
(Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam), while Singapore and Lao PDR have less than 
five million people; Brunei Darussalam less than half a million.  
 
                                                 
1  Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  
2  A word on country names is relevant here: Myanmar is also referred to as Burma, especially by 
those who do not recognize the legitimacy of the current regime, while Laos is officially known as 
the Lao PDR (Peoples’ Democratic Republic), and Brunei is short for Brunei Darussalam. 2          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
Second, most of the countries have achieved rapid economic development for most 
of the past 25 years, and longer in some cases. Four of them – Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand – were classified by the World Bank (1993) as “miracle” 
economies. Since the late 1980s, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam have 
successfully engineered a transition from planned to market economies with 
significantly increased growth rates and sharp reductions in poverty. The region’s 
economic dynamism and steadily expanding cooperation created a virtuous circle, 
with increased ASEAN’s regional harmony providing an enabling and more 
conducive business environment. Nevertheless, ASEAN membership has been no 
guarantee of economic success. Myanmar and the Philippines, for example, were 
touted in early development economics literature as being prime for rapid economic 
development, yet they have underperformed, the former disastrously so. 
 
Third, ASEAN diplomacy and cooperation have been characterized by caution, 
pragmatism, and consensus-based decision-making. The so-called “ASEAN Way” is 
enshrined in noninterference in others internal affairs and can be characterized by 
lowest-common-denominator decision-making. ASEAN leaders have deliberately 
avoided creating a strong supranational regional institution, and the ASEAN 
Secretariat has been deliberately underpowered, serving more as a diplomatic 
facilitator and conference organizer rather than a strong EU-type agency. These 
characteristics are both strengths and weaknesses: they explain ASEAN’s durability, 
but also limit effectiveness and capacity for strong and decisive action. 
 
Fourth—related to the third observation—ASEAN has never been, and probably will 
never be, an EU type organization, nor even a NAFTA-type economic bloc. That is, in 
the foreseeable future it is unlikely to adopt a common external trade regime, with 
completely free commerce among member states.. In fact, although it appears in a 
formal sense to be a quasi-preferential trading bloc, in practice, most of trade 
liberalization have been multilateralized as part of unilateral domestic reforms 
individually. Moreover, ASEAN is even less likely to develop formal mechanisms for 
macroeconomic policy coordination, leading for example to a common currency or 
central bank. ASEAN’s key challenge has from birth been to define a role for itself, 
especially since Asia’s two giants, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India, 
are now growing faster than ASEAN in aggregate. Will it, as some pundits suggest, 
be forever at the crossroads, institutionally unable to establish a stronger variant of 
economic cooperation, and therefore confined to a loose association, a forum for 
leaders only to discuss issues of regional interest? 
 
This paper introduces ASEAN, and traces its evolution—focussing on programs for 
economic integration. It also critically evaluates past performance and, based on this, 
examines prospects for the future.  
 
Section 2 provides an overview of the 10 ASEAN economies, and the development 
of the group as an institution. Section 3 examines ASEAN economic cooperation and 
integration with reference to merchandise trade, which was the principal focus of 
initiatives for its first quarter century. Section 4 then investigates a range of “trade 
plus” measures, including efforts to develop a broader range of closer economic 
relations both within and beyond the region—against the backdrop of ASEAN’s 
expanded membership, the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, the rise of the PRC, and 
the rapidly evolving regional commercial architecture. Concluding observations are 
presented in section 5. 
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2.  ASEAN and ASEAN Economic Development 
 
2.1.   The Evolution of ASEAN 
 
There are four more or less distinct phases in the evolution of ASEAN (Table 1). The 
first phase commenced with its establishment in 1967, in a highly uncertain regional 
and global environment over-shadowed by conflict. This was at the height of the cold 
war, conflict in Viet Nam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia was at its peak, and the PRC was 
in the throes of its cultural revolution. Indonesia had only recently renounced its 
intention to “crush” Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore had separated after a brief 
union, Malaysia and the Philippines were in dispute over Sabah, and there were (or 
had been recently) significant leftist insurgencies in all but Singapore. Thailand was 
widely regarded in the West as a likely next “domino” to fall to the communist 
advance. Earlier attempts at establishing a regional association, such as the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), and a possible three-nation “Malay” group, 
Maphilindo, had not progressed. A major facilitating factor in the 1967 meeting and 
declaration was regime change in Indonesia in early 1966, with the Suharto 
administration signaling its intention to rejoin the international community, to focus on 
economic development, and to seek better relations with its neighbors. Then, as now, 
ASEAN was only able to progress as fast as its dominant power. 
 
Table 1: ASEAN - Major Dates 
 
Date Event 
 8 August 1967   Bangkok Declaration establishes ASEAN. 
23-24 February 1976  Major Bali Summit. 
8 January 1984  Brunei Darussalam joins. 
28 January 1992  AFTA/CEPT launched. 
28 July 1995  Viet Nam joins. 
23 July 1997  Lao PDR and Myanmar join. 
15 December 1997  Vision 2020 to accelerate economic integration. 
30 April 1999  Cambodia joins.  
6-8 May 2000   ASEAN+3 announce Chiang Mai Initiative. 
7 October 2003  ASEAN Economic Community launched. 
22 February 2009  Expanded CMI launched. 
 
Source: ASEAN Website, www.aseansec.org 
 
The vision of the leaders therefore focused primarily on establishing regional 
harmony. While all were strongly anti-communist in outlook, they explicitly 
emphasized socio-economic cooperation and development rather than defense and 
security. In 1969 the ASEAN Foreign Ministers commissioned a study on ASEAN 
economic cooperation to be conducted by the United Nations. The resulting report, 
known as the Kansu Report (after its leader, Professor G. Kansu), was completed in 
1972. But it was not widely circulated, and was not formally published until 1974 (as 
United Nations, 1974). Its recommendations on economic cooperation reflected both 
popular thinking at the time as well as the inclination of ASEAN member countries. 
Specifically, it proposed trade liberalization through selective, or product-by-product 4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
tariff negotiations, package deal arrangements for large industrial projects, and 
financial cooperation. 
 
Meanwhile, various cooperation activities had begun, including reports by various 
committees covering commerce and industry, agriculture, tourism, transport, and 
telecommunications. As early as 1971, for example, the commerce and industry 
committee was exploring the possibility of trade fairs and cooperation, trade 
liberalization, harmonization of trade statistics, and industrial complementation 
projects. The spirit of the Kansu report was broadly accepted, including in principle 
the notions of joint industrial projects and of reciprocity among relevant parties.  
 
The second phase began with the Bali Summit of the five leaders in February 1976. 
This marked the beginning of a formal set of regional cooperation measures. These 
comprised the ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (APTA), the ASEAN Industrial 
Projects (AIPs), the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and the ASEAN 
Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJVs). APTA, the most significant of the four, represented 
the first attempt to promote intra-ASEAN trade through institutional integration and 
regional trade preferences. The AIPs, on the other hand, were designed to establish 
in each member country a large-scale, inter-governmental project. The AIC and the 
AIJVs were aimed at promoting specialization in complementary products and to 
facilitate resource pooling.  
 
These initiatives were broadly consistent with the Kansu and other reports. They 
reflected the desire on the part of leaders to “put some flesh on the bones” of 
regional cooperation, at least in a minimal, non-threatening sense. They were 
generally similar to other regional initiatives being promoted in the developing 
world—notably in Latin America, the Caribbean, and East Africa. A major trigger was 
the reunification of Viet Nam in April 1975 and communist take-overs in Cambodia 
and Lao PDR. ASEAN meanwhile became a more active organization in international 
affairs. It began to caucus as a group, for example in the United Nations and on 
issues of common concern, such as market access for its labor-intensive 
manufactures and tropical cash crops. Dialogue-partner relationships with a wide 
array of countries and regions were established, and some of these formed the basis 
for subsequent regional architecture initiatives. ASEAN also began to be active 
diplomatically, especially its attempt to isolate Viet Nam for its role in the removal of 
the murderous Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. 
 
However, none of the four economic cooperation programs had any significant 
impact on regional economic relations (Imada and Naya, 1992). Indeed, they were 
explicitly designed to have minimal effect. In spite of the early enthusiasm, the APTA 
had little impact on intra-regional trade. The tariff cuts were not implemented on an 
across-the-board basis but rather on product-by-product basis. Hence the commodity 
coverage was narrow, the tariff cuts were too small to have any discernible effect on 
trade,
3 and implementation was half-hearted.
4 Moreover, APTA failed to deal with 
                                                 
3  Until 1981, most of the items on the list had tariff reductions of just 10%. In that year, the size of the 
tariff cuts for products already listed was increased to 20%–25%. But this was still regarded as too 
low by the business community, which argued that cuts of 30%–50% would be needed to have a 
perceptible effect (Saw, 1982). More generally, as Ariff (1991) points out, a major problem with 
APTA was the failure to consult and involve the business community. 
4  The first list, presented to the Fifth ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) meeting in Singapore in July 
1977, contained only 71 products (15 from Indonesia, 14 from each of the other four) for the 10% 
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non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which were generally a more serious impediment to trade 
than tariffs. The AIP, AIC and AIJVs also had limited success. In the case of the 
AIJVs, for example, the Philippines and Thailand were in dispute over wanting to 
produce the same automotive parts (Ajanant, 1997). More generally, the failure of 
these initiatives was symptomatic of the members’ unwillingness and 
unpreparedness to pursue either trade liberalization or regional integration at the 
time. Notions of infant industry were still popular. 
 
There was little further progress during the 1980s. Brunei Darussalam’s accession in 
1984 occurred upon independence. During 1984–87, the Philippines was engulfed in 
economic and political crisis, and effectively disengaged from ASEAN. The collapse 
in commodity prices in the mid-1980s pushed both Indonesia and Malaysia—and by 
extension Singapore—into recession, in turn prompting swift and effective reforms, 
but lessening interest in the broader regional agenda. 
 
The third phase started in 1992 with another leaders’ Summit at which the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), was announced. This marked a clear break with the past. 
The emphasis was on stronger economic cooperation: for the first time, “free trade” 
was the regional objective, there was a clear timetable for implementation, and a 
“negative list” approach was adopted, in that all goods trade was to be included 
within AFTA unless explicitly excluded. The six leaders agreed to reduce the 
common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) rates to 0%–5% by 2008, with an interim 
target of 20% by 1998–2000. This deadline was subsequently advanced to 2005 at 
the Fifth ASEAN Summit in 1995, and later to 2003. The leaders also agreed that 
each country would have at least 85% of its tariff lines in the ”Inclusion List” by 2000, 
and 90% by 2001. 
 
Here, too, a range of regional and external drivers was at work. First, there was 
general recognition that the 1976 measures were cosmetic and ineffective. Second, 
there was increased self-confidence in the region. Indonesia in particular had 
weathered the mid-1980s debt crisis effectively, and introduced sweeping policy 
reforms. Third, substantive regional associations were coming into vogue elsewhere, 
especially with the signing in 1991 of the EU Maastricht Accord and the imminent 
extension of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to Mexico, a middle-
income competitor in the crucial US export market. Fourth, the PRC was now 
growing very fast, and attracting large foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. ASEAN 
leaders felt they had to present the region as a competitive single-market alternative 
to the PRC. Fifth, other changes in the regional and global commercial architecture 
were gathering momentum and threatened to overshadow slow-moving ASEAN. 
Notable here were the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) process in 1989 and the promulgation of the Uruguay trade round in 1995.  
 
ASEAN leaders built on this renewed vigor by seeking to extend its geographic 
spread and commercial depth.. By the early 1990s, Viet Nam had clearly signaled its 
intention to adopt market-oriented reforms and to look outwards. The earlier 
                                                                                                                                                                      
reduction in tariffs. These products constituted just 2.5% of intra-ASEAN trade in 1975 (Saw, 1982). 
Although the number of items grew quickly, the scheme still only covered 5% of intra-ASEAN trade 
in 1986 (Edwards and Wong, 1996). The right of members to exclude “sensitive” items from the list 
was so widely exploited that only minimally traded goods were included. Moreover, some of the 
“concessions” were memorable, including snow ploughs and specially created but fictitious trade 
categories. 6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
antipathy toward the communist regime gave way to pragmatism, fuelled in both 
cases by a common apprehension toward the PRC. Thus Viet Nam joined in 1995, 
followed by Lao PDR and (with a delay owing to its domestic political instability) 
Cambodia. Despite some reservations, ASEAN also invited Myanmar to join, partly 
for geopolitical reasons and partly in an effort to engage one of the world’s most 
isolated states economically and politically.  
 
ASEAN has played a constructive role in its commercial engagement with the three 
reforming states in mainland Southeast Asia. ASEAN membership has reinforced 
their outward orientation, built confidence in their reform momentum, and enabled 
them to learn from their more advanced neighbors. The four mainland states 
negotiated phased-in arrangements for accession to AFTA and other agreements.  
Thus Viet Nam was given until 2006 to bring down tariffs on products in its Inclusion 
List to no more than 5%. For Lao PDR and Myanmar it was 2008, while owing to its 
delayed accession Cambodia had until 2010. As of 2009, almost 80% of the products 
of the new member countries had been moved into their respective Inclusion Lists, 
and of these about two-thirds have tariffs within the 0%–5% range. Thus the 
implementation of the AFTA accords for this group is on track. 
 
By the mid-1990s, and consistent with the global trend in preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs), ASEAN began to cautiously develop arrangements for trade in 
services, investment, harmonization of customs, and in other fields. The ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) was signed 15 December 1995 at the 
Fifth ASEAN Summit Meeting in Bangkok. This was an ambitious agreement with two 
main objectives: to substantially eliminate all restrictions (both discriminatory and 
market access measures) to trade in services among member countries, and to 
liberalize trade in services by expanding the depth and scope of liberalization beyond 
those undertaken by member states under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). 
 
Given the importance of FDI in the region, ASEAN was one of the first regional 
groups in the “South” to adopt formal instruments to try to promote and protect cross-
border investment among its members. A number of agreements were signed, the 
most significant of which was the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment 
Area (AIA) in October 1998, which was subsequently expanded and consolidated 
into the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) in February 2009. 
 
However, just as the original leaders’ dream of “one Southeast Asia” was being 
realized, in mid-1997 the Asian financial crisis suddenly erupted. What transpired in 
its aftermath is now well known. Notwithstanding its ferocity, the direct crisis impact 
was surprisingly short-lived. Most crisis economies experienced a V-shaped 
recovery, although they have generally returned to somewhat lower growth 
trajectories,putting aside the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC).. For ASEAN as an 
institution, the crisis had two principal effects. First, the region as a whole lost some 
of its commercial attractiveness, especially as the PRC and India were largely 
unaffected by the crisis. Moreover, ASEAN was seen by many as an ineffective and 
feeble institution, unable to respond decisively at a time of crisis. This was despite 
attempts to be responsive, such as decisions taken at the ASEAN summit in Ha Noi 
in 1998 to (i) accelerate AFTA implementation; and (ii) expand ASEAN cooperation 
to include PRC, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3). In addition to its crisis reaction, it was 
unable to play any role in two other major regional flashpoints of that period, the  
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Second, the crisis led to a general rethink about the future of economic cooperation, 
and the need for some sort of coordinated macroeconomic response capacity to 
avert such future events. This led to the current fourth phase in the evolution of 
ASEAN, dominated by two key features. These are the return to growth (despite the 
immediate effects of the GFC), and the struggle to define its rationale and identity 
against the backdrop of a fast-changing regional and global environment, including a 
plethora of initiatives affecting commercial policy architecture. 
 
Four features have dominated the commercial policy architecture in the first decade 
of the 21
stcentury, and all have posed new and difficult challenges for ASEAN. These 
developments, and their implications for ASEAN, are discussed in more detail in 
section 4 below. 
 
The first is the spread of PTAs. Singapore in particular, frustrated with slow pace of 
ASEAN, began to break ranks and embark on a bold strategy of PTAs. Although 
causing strain within the group, this had momentum or a domino effect with other 
ASEAN countries, especially Thailand, feeling compelled to follow. 
 
Second, there has been recognition that ASEAN is too small to address some of the 
broader, post-crisis macroeconomic coordination issues. For example, ASEAN is too 
small to seriously contemplate coordinated macroeconomic policy, such as a 
common exchange rate regime. As for emergency or crisis prevention measures—
including currency swaps and fiscal standby agreements—the huge international 
reserves accumulated in North Asia dictate that these economies will be the major 
players in any regional and international agreements on emergency finance. 
 
Third, ASEAN has now largely completed the “easy phase” of intra-regional trade 
liberalization. As of 2009, zero tariffs applied to 64% of products in the Inclusion List 
of the East Asia Summit process, or ASEAN-6 (ASEAN+3 plus India, Australia, and 
New Zealand). The average tariff for ASEAN-6 under the CEPT scheme is down to 
1.5%, from 12.8% when tariff cutting began in 1993. 
 
What remains are the politically more sensitive areas, heavy industry and food crops 
in particular. An unstated tenet of ASEAN trade liberalization is that the concessions 
would be “multilateralized” as long as it was politically acceptable domestically for the 
signatories to do so. But for more contentious liberalization, progress has been 
slower and exemptions have proliferated. For example, Indonesia periodically bans 
rice imports. As food prices rose sharply in 2008, there was a free-for-all in the 
regional rice markets, with talk of a “Mekong rice cartel” among exporters, and the 
then president of the Philippines (now the world’s largest rice importer) announcing 
that her country would buy rice “at any price”. Each country has sought to protect its 
steel industry. Malaysia has been reluctant to liberalize its auto trade barriers for fear 
of competition from Thailand, the regional leader in the industry. In addition to these 
                                                 
5  Writing at this time, the late Hadi Soesastro (1999, 158–9), one of the leading thinkers in ASEAN on 
regional cooperation, observed: “The public has been largely disappointed with ASEAN. Its 
perception is that of a helpless ASEAN, an ASEAN that cannot move decisively, an ASEAN that is 
trapped under its organizational and bureaucratic weight, and an ASEAN that fails to respond to 
real, current problems and challenges.” 8          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
barriers at the border, a further obstacle to the notion of “ASEAN as a single market” 
has been the proliferation of sub-national barriers, particularly in Indonesia, where 
many provincial and kabupaten (county) governments have introduced illegal levies 
on cross-border transport (McCulloch, 2009).
6  
 
Fourth, the rise of fragmentation trade called into question the viability of all forms of 
PTA’s that do not multilateralize concessions. East Asia has been the dominant 
player in this fast-growing segment of international trade, which involves the physical 
relocation of stages of the production process that can be transferred to lower-cost 
sites.
7 Parts and components in the electronics and automotive industries have been 
the major segment of this trade, although it is now spreading rapidly to (poorly 
measured) services trade through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) facilities. Within 
East Asia, ASEAN countries stand out for their heavy dependence on production 
fragmentation trade. In 2005–06, for example, parts and components accounted for 
44% of ASEAN manufactured exports, up from 29% in 1992–93. The shares are 
higher still for some countries: 64% for the Philippines in 2005–06 (up from 24% in 
1992–93), 53% in Singapore (from 32%) and 51% in Malaysia (from 37%). Over this 
period, ASEAN’s share of world trade in parts and components also rose 
significantly, from 7.8% to 10.9% (Athukorala and Menon, 2009). 
 
Clearly, the management of global production facilities, sourcing inputs to the final 
product from many countries, is fundamentally incompatible with PTAs: some 
countries may be signatories to various PTAs, and these agreements are unlikely to 
be mutually compatible. The response of governments and multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in these industries has been to locate such activities in free trade zones, thus 
placing their operations on a free trade footing. More recently, governments have 
come to recognize the impracticality of any form of trade barriers—unilateral or 
preferential—in this segment, through the establishment of the International 
Technology Agreement (Bhagwati, 2008), to which the major Southeast Asian 
electronics exporters are signatories. 
 
2.2.   The ASEAN Economies: An Overview 
 
Table 2 summarizes the key socio-economic features of ASEAN’s 10 member 
countries, which are diverse in practically every respect. The richest country, 
Singapore, has a per capita income of about 50 times the poorest, Cambodia.
8 In 
purchase power parity (PPP) terms, the range is narrower, but is still more than 25:1, 
larger than for any other regional association in the world. Of course, the range is 
exaggerated by Singapore, whose per capita income is 5 and 3.5 times that of third 
ranked Malaysia. But even excluding Singapore (and Brunei Darussalam), the range 
                                                 
6  In addition to these formal and informal trade barriers, studies of the region’s logistics have drawn 
attention to the high trade costs in some of the lower income ASEAN economies, resulting from 
poor infrastructure, limited competition, and regulatory impediments in the customs agencies. See 
Brooks and Hummels (2009) and Shepherd and Wilson (2009).   
7  See Athukorala (2006), Athukorala and Menon (2009), and Kimura (2006) for detailed examinations 
of this trade. 
8  Data are not always available for Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar, the former because it is so 
small as to not always be included in comparative international statistics, and the latter because its 
statistical system is considered unreliable. In the rankings, Brunei Darussalam’s per capita income 
can safely be assumed to be similar to Singapore’s, and Myanmar’s probably a little below that of 
Cambodia. So assertions about the range of incomes are unaffected by their exclusion.  
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Table 2: ASEAN - Key Socio-Economic Indicators 
 
Country 
GDP, 2008  GDP per capita, 
2008 







ratio at  
$2/day, PPP  













Agri  Ind  Man  Ser  Value  Rank 
 Brunei Darussalam
/1  14.6  19.7  37,053  50,199  0.4  75  1  71  10  28  0.9  30  … 
 Cambodia  9.6  28.0  651  1,905  14.7  83  32  27  19  41  0.6  131  68
/2 
 Indonesia  514.4  907.3  2,254  3,975  228.3  126  14  47  27  39  0.7  107  54
/3 
 Lao PDR  5.2  13.2  837  2,134  6.2  27  40  31  20  29  0.6  130  77
/4 
 Malaysia  194.9  383.7  7,221  14,215  27.0  82  10  48  28  42  0.8  63  8 
/2 
 Myanmar
/1  26.2  68.0  446  1,156  58.8  75  ..    ..  ..  ..    0.6  132  ..   
 Philippines  166.9  317.1  1,847  3,510  90.3  303  14  32  22  54  0.8  90  45
/5 
 Singapore  181.9  238.5  37,597  49,284  4.8  7,024  0  31  25  69  0.9  25  ..   
 Thailand  260.7  519.1  3,869  7,703  67.4  132  12  46  36  43  0.8  78  12
/2 




bil = billion, mil = million, Agri = agriculture, Ind = industry, Man = manufacturing, and Ser = services. 





Source: World Bank, 2009 World Development Indicators; IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2009; UN, 2009 Human Development Indicators. 10          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
is very large, about 11-fold. In terms of economic size, however, Indonesia is the 
dominant economy—with over 35% of ASEAN GDP—almost double that of second-
ranked Thailand. There follows three intermediate ranked economies, Malaysia 
Singapore, and the Philippines (with relative sizes depending on which GDP series is 
used), followed by the four small mainland states, of which Viet Nam is by far the 
largest. Cambodia and Lao PDR are still officially regarded as “least developed 
states”, reflecting their poverty and (along with Viet Nam) the historical legacy of 
deep conflict. 
 
The demographics of the 10 countries also vary considerably. Here also, Indonesia is 
by far the largest, with 39% of ASEAN’s population, followed by three mid-sized 
populations, in order the Philippines, Viet Nam, and Thailand. Myanmar’s 50 million 
is a very approximate estimate. Malaysia is approaching 30 million people, while the 
remaining four states are considerably smaller. Population densities provide a clue to 
comparative advantage in land-intensive activities. Apart from the special case of 
Singapore, the Philippines and Viet Nam have the highest population densities, with 
the three poor mainland states much less heavily settled. Indonesia’s average 
density of course obscures its huge demographic imbalance, with the main island of 
Java containing regions ranking among the highest population densities in the world. 
 
There are also large differences in economic structure, reflecting both levels of 
development and relative resource endowments. Cambodia and Lao PDR (and 
almost certainly Myanmar) are still heavily agrarian economies, with one-third or 
more of GDP derived from agriculture, while the richer economies have largely 
shifted out of agriculture. Several of the economies have experienced rapid 
industrialization over the recent decades, with industry accounting for at least one-
quarter of GDP in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Services as 
expected dominate the Singapore economy. For a complex set of reasons, they also 
account for more than half of the still low-income Philippine economy. 
 
Welfare indicators correlate closely with per capita income. Thus human 
development indicator (HDI) indexes for Singapore and Brunei Darussalam are well 
above that of the others (although internationally their HDI rankings are well below 
their per capita income rankings), with Malaysia and Thailand a good deal higher 
than the other six economies. Those for the three poorest mainland states are among 
the lowest in the world. Poverty incidence, as measured by the percentage of the 
population living below $2/day, is still very high in these three (again with accurate 
estimates for Myanmar unavailable), and still over 40% in Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Viet Nam. Poverty incidence has however fallen rapidly in all cases of sustained 
rapid growth in the region. 
 
These socio-economic indicators highlight several distinctive features of the ASEAN 
group, and they have important implications for how it operates. ASEAN is unlike any 
other regional group with respect to its balance of economic power. Singapore—by 
far the richest economy—has less than 1% of the population, and it is ethnically 
distinct. By contrast, the largest economy, Indonesia, is barely in the middle-income 
developing group, and its per capita GDP is below the ASEAN average. This 
contrasts with NAFTA, dominated by one rich economy, and with the European 
Union, with its four major economies together with a diverse group of member 
countries on average considerably richer than that of ASEAN. ASEAN also differs 
from SARC, SADC, and Mercosur in this respect, with India, South Africa, and Brazil  
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respectively the dominant economies (though not the richest in the first and third 
case).  
 
Moreover, owing to its unique historical, political, economic, and cultural 
characteristics, Singapore is unable to provide the leadership that might otherwise 
have been expected of a country that is the richest and has historically been the most 
economically dynamic, except by example, in the high quality of economic policy, 
legal and other institutions, and its superb infrastructure. Indeed, leading security 
analysts sometimes characterize its principal challenge as “dealing with vulnerability”. 
Although referring primarily to defense and foreign policies, the sentiment also has 
broader implications for the country’s policies, ranging from large defense 




There is also greater diversity in economic structure—and hence scope for intra-
regional specialization and commerce—than is commonly recognized. There are net 
food exporters (most of the mainland states) and importers (most of archipelagic 
Southeast Asia); resource-poor and resource-rich nations (the latter Brunei 
Darussalam and Malaysia, especially on a per capita basis); net labor importers (the 
four higher income states) and net labor exporters; while Singapore and to a lesser 
extent Malaysia have advanced research and development (R&D) capacity and 
higher education resources, compared with their neighbors’ much weaker human 
capital bases. 
 
ASEAN economies are diverse not only with respect to levels of development but 
also institutional and commercial policy environments. Three of the economies, 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, were classified by Sachs-Warner as “always 
open”. Singapore has never deviated from this open borders approach, apart from a 
very mild and brief period of import substitution as part of its short-lived union with 
Malaysia. By contrast, the four poorer economies of mainland Southeast Asia have 
been largely closed to the international economy, in the case of Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
and Viet Nam until they began their historic and increasingly decisive reorientation 
from planned to market economies. Indonesia and the Philippines have for extended 
periods erected high barriers to international trade and investment, but since the mid-
1980s have become increasingly open. 
 
Various estimates of openness and the summary indicators of commercial policy 
regimes in the 10 countries presented in Table 3 confirm these generalizations. With 
respect to trade/GDP ratios, Singapore is one of the most open economies in the 
world, with Malaysia, Viet Nam, Thailand, and Cambodia also having figures above 
100%. The tariff data show a broadly similar picture, with weighted averages below 
10% for most of the economies, and only marginally higher for Cambodia and Viet 
Nam. The higher figures for the latter two economies in part illustrate their success in 
converting opaque trade barriers into transparent tariffs. Smuggling remains 
extensive in those economies with remaining trade barriers, long porous borders and 
weak administrative capacity. Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Indonesia stand out in this 
respect. The dispersions in tariffs across sectors are generally declining, with a 
                                                 
9  These features also have implications for Singapore’s role within ASEAN. As a senior official once 
caustically noted in private, the other ASEAN members not infrequently tell it to “provide the funds 
and then shut up”. 12          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
switch from above- to below-average protection for manufactures observable in 
several countries. Like tariffs, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are generally declining, but 
they remain significant in some cases for the usual political economy reasons. Highly 
protected sectors are often those dominated by state-owned enterprises in the former 




























/4   
Rank 
Brunei Darussalam  95  82  na (v low)  ..  75.8  14 
Cambodia 138  49  10.8  106  34.3  22 
Indonesia 55  14  4.3  131  45.4  19 
Lao  PDR  87  28 9.3  150 9.7  24 
Malaysia  200 43  3.4 58  60.4  4 
Myanmar ..  29  3.9  176  1  .. 
Philippines 85  13  3.2  104  51.7  21 
Singapore 429  160  0  2  99.5  1 
Thailand  144 35  4.7 67  59.9  3 
Viet Nam  167  60  13.3  145  32.4  13 
 
Notes:  
na = not available  
/1  FDI data are estimates for 2007. 
/2  Measures ten components of economic freedom, assigning a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 
100 represents the maximum freedom. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an overall economic 
freedom score for each country.  
/3 One of the six dimensions of governance captured by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Reflects the ability of the government to provide sound policies and regulations that enable and promote private 
sector development.  
/4 This index averages the country's percentile rankings on 10 topics, made up of a variety of indicators, giving 
equal weight to each topic. A high ranking on the index means the regulatory environment is conducive to the 
operation of business. 
Source: World Bank, 2009 World Development Indicators; UNCTAD, 2009 Foreign Direct Investment Database;   
The Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, 2009 Index of Economic Freedom; World Bank, 2009 Worldwide 
Governance Indicators; World Bank, 2009 Doing Business. 
 
 
Employing the stock of FDI to GDP as a crude measure of openness, Singapore has 
one of the highest ratios in the world, with very high figures (over 40%) for Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Viet Nam. Of course, these indicators of 
openness do not necessarily imply the existence of secure, transparent and low-
corruption business environments. Subjective, perceptions-based indicators, for all 
their limitations, portray a somewhat different story. For illustration, we also include in 
Table 3 three widely used comparative indicators: the index of economic freedom, 
                                                 
10  Various trade policy country studies illuminate these NTBs in more detail and examine the trade 
reform agenda in the respective countries. As illustrations, see for example Athukorala (2006a) on 
Viet Nam, Bird et al (2008) on Indonesia, and Fane (2006) on Lao PDR. See also the ASEAN 
Secretariat website for detailed listings of NTBs by country, at www.aseansec.org/16355.htm.  
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regulatory quality as measured by the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, and the 
Bank’s Doing Business series. On these indicators, the rankings generally correlate 
quite closely with per capita income. Singapore stands far apart from its neighbors, 
with rankings at or very close to the top in all three series. Brunei Darussalam 
follows, with Malaysia and then Thailand some way further behind. Although 
reforming quickly, the former command economies are still regarded as having 
uncertain business climates, weak property rights, high-levels of corruption, and in 
some cases all three. However, in aggregate they do not rank far behind Indonesia 
and the Philippines, illustrating in turn the slower pace of reform in the latter two. 
Whereas 15 years ago the original ASEAN-5 group was well advanced on the 
transition economies, the distinction is now increasingly blurred. 
 
 
3.   “Old Issues”: Merchandise Trade 
 
Two features dominate ASEAN trade. First, ASEAN economies trade predominantly 
with the rest of the world. That is, extra-regional trade is much larger than intra-
regional trade. Since 1970, the latter has generally constituted between 15% and 
30% of total ASEAN trade (Figure 1). These seemingly low shares of intra-ASEAN 
trade have attracted a lot of critical comment, and some have used it to question 
ASEAN’s viability as a regional group. An important point to bear in mind in 
interpreting these shares is the fact that the ASEAN economies only account for a 
small share of global trade flows. When adjusted for this scale factor—through the 
computation of trade intensity measures for instance—the picture that emerges is 
quite different. For 2006, for example, all intra-ASEAN flows record an index greater 
than unity, and many are in double-digits and range to a maximum of 53. 
 
There is also a general upward trend in the intra-ASEAN trade shares, reflecting the 
rising importance of the group in world trade. Earlier, commodities dominated this 
trade, with Singapore the entrepot for resource-rich Indonesia and Malaysia. This in 
turn explained the volatility in shares. While still important, intra-regional trade is now 
considerably more broad-based, with manufactures playing a larger role, increasingly 
as Singapore-centered global production networks. Note that these statistics refer 
only to merchandise trade and do not include the fast-growing but poorly measured 
services trade. It is also important to contrast the much lower intra-ASEAN share with 
that of the EU figure of around 70%. Since, as will be argued below, most AFTA 
trade concessions are multilateralized, the observed increase in intra-regional trade 
shares must be explained by complementarities and market-driven factors rather 
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Source: UNCTAD, 2010. Handbook of Statistics Online. Data for 2009 from the ASEAN Secretariat. 
 
Second, Singapore dominates intra-ASEAN trade flows, as shown in Table 4.11 The 
largest single trade flow is between Singapore and Malaysia, as it always has been 
historically. Singapore’s trade with Indonesia and Thailand is also very large. The 
largest non-Singapore trade flows involve the region’s second most open economy, 
Malaysia—with the two neighbors with which it shares a land boundary, Indonesia 
and Thailand. The matrix also shows the small scale of official trade of the poorer 
mainland states, although Viet Nam is rising fast. The countries also differ with 
respect to the importance of ASEAN within their total trade. For both Singapore and 
Malaysia, ASEAN markets constitute more than one-quarter of total exports. The 
share is much lower for Indonesia, where natural resource exports to extra-regional 
markets are important, and for the Philippines, whose commercial patterns have 










                                                 
11  A word of caution is necessary in interpreting these trade shares. While aggregate trade flows are 
reasonably accurate, as they can be verified from major OECD trading partner statistics, some 
intra-ASEAN trade flows are at best approximate, owing to widespread physical and technical 
smuggling. For many years, Singapore has not released its trade statistics with Indonesia, for fear 
that any discrepancy with the Indonesian statistics may trigger accusations that the island state is 
complicit in smuggling. Smuggling from Myanmar is known to be extensive, as it was in the 
communist states of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam until their major trade liberalizations.  
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Table 4: Major Intra-ASEAN Trade Flows in 2008 
(% of Total Intra-ASEAN Trade) 
 
Partner 
ASEAN Country  
Indonesia Malaysia  Philippines Singapore Thailand  Viet  Nam 
 Indonesia  0  2.6  0.8  5.1  1.5 0.7 
  Malaysia  2.5 0 1.2  11.7 3.8  1.0 
 Philippines  0.2  0.8  0  1.0  0.6  neg 
 Singapore  14.2 16.3  2.9  0  5.2 3.5 
 Thailand  2.4  3.9  1.3  3.9  0 2.0 
  Viet  Nam  neg 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.5  0 
 
Notes: top 10 flows in bold; neg = very small,  <0.5%. 
Source: IMF. 2010. Direction of Trade Statistics.   
 
 
Two important implications for the governance of regional economic architecture flow 
from this analysis. First, it does not make sense for ASEAN to contemplate the 
formation of a customs union, since the major trade is outside the region. That is, the 
costs of trade diversion would almost certainly exceed the benefits of trade creation. 
Second, Singapore’s dominance of intra-ASEAN trade flows, and the country’s non-
negotiable commitment to open borders, means that any attempt to set a common 
external trade regime at anything other than that defined by Singapore is not feasible, 
since the latter would be a veto player. In other words, a common external ASEAN 
trade regime would have to be at Singapore levels. This does not necessarily 
preclude the adoption of free trade within ASEAN alongside differing trade policies 
for each state. Such an arrangement would imply a two-tier trade policy for all but 
Singapore, which is technically feasible but would obviously be administratively 
cumbersome and subject to widespread corruption. In any case, the fact that less 
than 10% of intra-ASEAN trade avails of AFTA concessions suggests that this 
approach is virtually irrelevant. The margins of preference between the AFTA and 
most favored nation (MFN) rates are already very low, and the administrative 
procedures render the AFTA option unattractive. We return to this issue below. 
 
 
4. “New  Issues”:  Services, FDI and Regional Economic 
Architecture 
 
ASEAN—AFTA and related initiatives in particular—has had a deeper regional 
economic integration objective since the early 1990s. What light does its experience 
shed on the broader question of whether PTAs can accelerate economic integration? 
The regional trade liberalization experience was discussed above. In this section we 
address this question with reference to a range of issues beyond the first-round 
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4.1.  Deepening Integration: Services Trade, FDI, Labor 
 
Following AFTA, ASEAN has also signed agreements relating to trade in services, 
intra-regional investment and labor movements. ASEAN economies are increasingly 
integrated in all these respects, but they are all market-driven, with little if any formal 
implementation of regional initiatives. 
 
Under the 1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), negotiations 
over the liberalization of services have focused on five sectors, namely financial 
services, transport, telecommunications, tourism, and professional business services. 
Progress has however been limited, owing to the lack of political commitment to open 
up the services market, weaknesses in negotiation frameworks, legal restrictions, 
and institutional limitations (Rajan and Sen, 2002). These problems have been 
compounded by the global tendency to liberalize services last, whether in the form of 
general market liberalization or specifically privatization and FDI liberalization.  
 
Of course, although it is notoriously difficult to measure, intra-ASEAN service trade is 
intense, driven by proximity (which generally matters more for services than with 
merchandise) and complimentary. In the majority of ASEAN countries, tourists from 
within the region dominate. In financial services and telecommunications, Singapore 
and Malaysia are major investors throughout the region. The flows of intra-regional 
education and health services are growing rapidly. These are essentially market-
driven transactions, which can be facilitated by simplified visa arrangements (such as 
the current ASEAN-wide visa-free facility) and other harmonization measures that 
lower transaction costs. However, it would hardly make sense for ASEAN 
governments to give preferential access to neighboring service providers over the 
best-practice global alternative. 
 
In the case of FDI, there are a number of sequentially related agreements, starting in 
1987 with the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 
commonly known as the ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA). More than 
a decade later, the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) was 
signed in October 1998 at the 30
th Meeting of the ASEAN Economics Ministers 
(AEM). The most significant initiative of the AIA was the preferential, or 
discriminatory, treatment afforded ASEAN investors in member countries for a fixed 
period of time. This preferential treatment was to take the form of access to particular 
industries available only to ASEAN member countries on a reciprocal basis.12 
However, in 2007, the 39
th Meeting of the AEM effectively nullified this preferential 
treatment, when the provisions were extended to foreign-owned ASEAN-based 
investors. In February 2009, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA) was signed, intended to be more comprehensive as it deals with liberalization, 
promotion, facilitation and protection, and adopting also a single negative list 
approach. 
 
Regional investment flows have risen rapidly over this period. But these are 
predominantly market-driven, and there is no evidence that they have been induced 
by the special provisions offered under the AIA and ACIA initiatives. That is, although 
                                                 
12  Access was to be provided through national treatment provisions within 6 months of the AIA 
signing. These exclusions were to be progressively phased out by 2003, extended to 2010 in the 
case of new ASEAN members.  
ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and the Future  |       17 
 
some of ASEAN’s investment provisions may represent a medium for regional 
protectionism or sectoral sheltering rather than liberalization, in practice they appear 
to have little impact (Jarvis et al, 2009). 
 
Singapore, with its extraordinarily high savings rate and international reserves, and 
its large government-linked corporate sector, has emerged as a major foreign 
investor, globally and regionally. Its scale is such that in several ASEAN countries it 
is among the top three foreign investors. Its investments are broad, including 
banking, telecoms, hotels, and real estate. As the major regional headquarters for 
MNEs, it is also a base for these companies investing elsewhere in the region. 
Malaysia too has become a major investor abroad, with a similar set of drivers at 
work—high savings rates, loss of comparative advantage in labor-intensive activities, 
and an activist government-linked company (GLC) sector. For example, both 
countries have emerged as major investors in Indonesia over the past decade in a 
diverse range of sectors, including banking, palm oil, hotels, and 
telecommunications. Thailand is now a major investor in the small neighboring 
ASEAN economies in a wide range of service, manufacturing, and resource-based 
activities, and despite occasional Thai-Cambodian hostilities. 
 
Table 5 provides estimates of realized FDI by for each ASEAN economy by source—
ASEAN and extra-ASEAN—for 2006–08, which are indicative of longer-term shares. 
Extra-ASEAN economies dominate these flows, and are typically five to seven times 
larger than those originating from within ASEAN. This applies to all economies, 
including the mainland transition economies which, in the early reform phase, 
received much of their FDI from neighboring ASEAN countries. It also needs to be 
noted that the intra-ASEAN share in total FDI flows to the region is less than the 
corresponding share for trade. This is to be expected given that, among the ASEAN-
10, only Singapore is an outward investor of any significant scale. The implication is 
that preferential investment schemes within ASEAN are unlikely to make economic 
sense for the foreseeable future. 
 
  Table 5: ASEAN Shares of FDI and Trade 
 
 Country  ASEAN share of inward 
FDI, 2006-2008
/1 (%) 
ASEAN share of 
exports, 2009 (%) 
ASEAN share of 
imports, 2009 (%) 
 Brunei Darussalam  7.8  17.1  51.8 
 Cambodia  30.8  12.9  37.3 
 Indonesia  27.4  21.1  28.7 
 Lao PDR  21.5  80.6  85.8 
 Malaysia  27.2  25.7  25.4 
 Myanmar  14.6  50.4  53.7 
 Philippines  0.1  15.2  25.4 
 Singapore  3.4  30.3  24.0 
 Thailand  31.6  21.3  20.0 
 Viet Nam  17.5  15.1  19.6 
Notes: 
na = not available 
/Data for 2008 are preliminary.  
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Regional labor markets are becoming increasingly integrated. Here too ASEAN has 
signed several formal accords since 2000, including the January 2007 ASEAN 
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. 
Discussions on implementation of this agreement are continuing. However, intra-
ASEAN labor flows occur independently of these arrangements and are largely 
market-driven, dictated by large inter-country wage differentials and open labor 
markets. Labor flows to, from, and within ASEAN countries are significant. Several 
lower-income countries are major labor exporters, particularly the Philippines, where 
remittances are the fourth largest in the developing world. The two richer countries, 
Singapore and Malaysia, together with tiny Brunei Darussalam, have always had 
very open labor markets, with 20% or more of their workforces temporary foreign 
workers. In neither case is there a deliberate preference for workers from other 
ASEAN countries, but in practice proximity and ethnic/cultural similarities result in the 
majority of these foreign workers coming from neighboring countries. This is 
particularly the case with Malaysia, where about 75% of the workers are estimated to 
be from Indonesia. Given the former’s delicate ethnic mix, it is widely believed that 
the dominant Malay community tacitly supports these large inflows. The Philippines is 
the second largest source of migrant workers, with particularly large inflows to East 
Malaysia. 
 
Table 6 provides one set of estimates of the stock of temporary intra-ASEAN 
migrants in 2006. Recognizing that they are almost certainly a considerable under-
estimate, they highlight the major flows. The three richer economies, Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, all with broadly open international labor markets, are the 
major recipients, while Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar are major labor sources. 
Among the 5.5 million recorded workers, three large concentrations stand out, 
accounting for about two-thirds of the total: migrants from Myanmar working in 
Thailand, Indonesians in Malaysia, and Malaysians in Singapore. Malaysia is unusual 
in that it is both a significant recipient and source, with the former predominantly low-
skilled workers and the latter higher skilled. Some of the other flows, while small in 
aggregate, are significant for the countries’ concerned. For example, about 10% of 
the Lao PDR workforce is estimated to work in Thailand, on a permanent or casual 
basis.  
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Brunei  Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand  Viet Nam ASEAN 
 Brunei Darussalam  neg neg neg neg neg neg  1 neg  neg  neg  1 
 Cambodia  neg  neg  neg 2 7  neg  neg  neg  232  neg  240 
 Indonesia  6 neg neg neg  1,215 neg  5  96  1  neg 1,323 
 Lao PDR  neg  1 neg neg neg neg  neg neg  257  neg  258 
 Malaysia  68  1 neg neg neg neg  neg 994  3  neg 1,066 
 Myanmar  neg neg neg neg  92 neg  neg neg  1,382  neg 1,475 
 Philippines  23  1 neg neg 353 neg  neg 136  3  neg  516 
 Singapore  3 1  neg  neg  87  neg  neg  neg  2  neg  92 
 Thailand  11 129 neg  3  86 neg  neg neg  neg  neg  229 
 Viet Nam  neg  157  neg 15 86  neg  1  neg  20  neg  279 
 ASEAN   111 290 neg  20 1,925  neg  8  1,226  1900  neg 5,480 
 
Note: Details may not add up to totals due to rounding off errors; neg indicates less than 1,000, or no estimates available. 
Source: ILO 2007.  Labor and Social Trends in ASEAN 2007: Integration, Challenges and Opportunities. Bangkok. 20          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
4.2.  The Rise of PTAs 
 
As noted, with the exception of ASEAN itself, the countries of Southeast Asia 
generally eschewed preferential trading arrangements until the late 1990s, preferring 
a combination of multilateral and unilateral measures. The former had resulted in a 
global trading environment that generally supported export expansion with few 
serious trade barriers, apart from some agricultural and labor-intensive manufactured 
products. There were meanwhile a series of significant domestic liberalizations in the 
1980s and 1990s, most particularly in the three communist states, but also in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. 
 
Since 2000, there has been little progress with multilateral liberalization, and 
domestic reform has slowed significantly. Not unrelated to these developments has 
been the proliferation of various forms of PTAs. Table 7 lists each ASEAN country’s 
participation in PTAs as of January 2010: 91 PTAs have been signed or are under 
implementation, 32 are under negotiation, and 36 proposed. These numbers include 
a variety of agreements, ranging from the comprehensive to the so-called “trade-lite”, 
and thus they are not strictly comparable. 
 
Table 7: FTA Status by Country, as of January 2010 
 
  UNDER NEGOTIATION  CONCLUDED  COUNTRY 
Proposed  Framework    








Brunei Darussalam  4  0  1  0          8  13 
Cambodia  2  0  1  0  6  9 
Indonesia  6  1  1  1  7  16 
Lao PDR   2  0  1  0  8  11 
Malaysia  3  1  5  2  8  19 
Myanmar  2  1  1  0  6  10 
Philippines  4  0  1  0  7  12 
Singapore  5  0  9  2  18  34 
Thailand  6  4  3  0  11  24 
Viet Nam  2  0  2  0  7  11 
Total  36  7  25  5  86  159 
 
Notes:  
1.   Proposed - parties are considering a free trade agreement, establishing joint study groups or joint task force, 
and conducting feasibility studies to determine the desirability of entering into an FTA. 
2a. Framework Agreement Signed/Under Negotiation - parties initially negotiate the contents of a framework 
agreement (FA), which serves as a framework for future negotiations.  
2b.  Under Negotiation - parties begin negotiations without a framework agreement (FA).  
3a. Signed - parties sign the agreement after negotiations have been completed. Some FTAs would require 
legislative or executive ratification.  
3b. Under Implementation - when the provisions of an FTA becomes effective, e.g., when tariff cuts begin.                           
As of January 2010  
Source: ADB Asian Regional Integration Center 2010, Free Trade Agreement Database for Asia.  
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Singapore has adopted the most PTAs in ASEAN, with 20 concluded, and 14 under 
negotiation or proposed. It accounts for over one-quarter of the regional PTAs under 
implementation. Its government decided to be proactive in this commercial 
diplomacy, frustrated with the slow pace of ASEAN and alert to commercial 
opportunities elsewhere. It might appear puzzling that free-trade Singapore would 
embark on this route, since it has little to offer by way of reciprocal market access. 
However, it has made some concessions in its more protected services sector, and it 
has used PTAs to extract useful concessions from partner countries (for example, 
extensive access to Indian landing rights for Singapore Airlines). It has also suited 
other countries to engage with Singapore as a “training exercise” in preparation for 
negotiations with larger, more complex economies. Singapore is seen as small, non-
threatening, and with a nonexistent agricultural sector, traditionally the area of 
greatest sensitivity in trade negotiations. Singapore’s participation in these PTAs has 
attracted subdued criticism from its ASEAN partners, but it has not seriously 
threatened the viability of ASEAN. 
 
Thailand has also been active with PTAs, particularly during 2001–2006, when 
Thaksin Shinawatra was prime minister. This is somewhat ironic because, although 
traditionally a relatively open economy, Thailand has achieved little progress with its 
own trade reform since the 1980s. The governments of Indonesia, Philippines and 
the other four mainland Southeast Asian states have thus far engaged very little in 
PTAs, reflecting mainly their concerns with domestic reform and a generally reactive 
approach to international commercial diplomacy. The smaller transition economies, in 
particular, have struggled to cope with the demands of formalizing their trade 
regimes, converting the many implicit and obscure NTBs into tariffs. This is also in 
the context of securing membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (except 
for Lao PDR, which is still an applicant), then implementing the formal requirements, 
all in an institutional environment of very limited analytical expertise in their 
bureaucracies and many competing demands from the international donor 
community.  
 
Three general observations need to be made about these agreements. First, they 
vary considerably in their scope, depth, and coverage. The larger economic powers, 
notably Japan and the US, are able to extract specific requirements, for example, the 
exclusion of sensitive agricultural products in the case of the former and intellectual 
property rights in the latter. Where ASEAN rules apply, the agreements are more 
likely to be multilateralized and have less restrictive rules of origin (ROOs). Some of 
the agreements are very minor, and have little functional significance.13 Second, 
there is considerable variation in the capacity of ASEAN governments to implement 
these agreements. Singapore, for example, has a high-quality analytical and 
negotiating capacity, while Lao PDR has practically none of these resources at its 
disposal and is struggling to satisfy the requirements for WTO membership. PTAs 
involving the transition countries are a clear distraction from the more important task 
of general trade reform. 
 
Thirdly, there is the issue of whether these and the broader regional initiatives 
discussed in the following section will collapse into a plurilateral, pan-Asian 
                                                 
13  For example, out-of-season fruits and vegetables could motivate a PTA, such as in the US-Chile 
agreement (that also included copper), or the proposed Indonesia-Pakistan agreement related to 
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agreement. This approach has gained further impetus from the October 2009 East 
Asian Summit in Hua Hin, Thailand, where the Japanese and Australian prime 
ministers put forward proposals for an ASEAN+6 and APEC-wide FTA respectively, 
and with the former receiving ASEAN support. Both proposals are substantially 
driven by political and strategic objectives. What if any contribution do they make to 
clearing up the current, distorted trade policy landscape? 
 
According to one school of thought, these multiple and overlapping PTAs could be 
consolidated into a single East Asian PTA. However, details of how these PTAs can 
somehow be folded into a much broader multilateral agreement remain sparse. It is 
also perplexing that advocates of this approach often argue that bilateral agreements 
are able to achieve much deeper integration because only two parties are involved, 
but then inexplicably expect the same results from a consolidated agreement 
involving many more parties. 
 
Even if the “consolidation approach” may be able to address the proliferation of often 
overlapping PTAs, and make the best of the current mess, other options could 
achieve the same outcome without creating yet another FTA. Two such alternatives 
include the multilateralization of preferential accords, and the dilution of ROOs. The 
original members of ASEAN have employed the multilateralization approach with 
success, and today close to 90% of the preferences of their PTA are available to 
nonmembers on an MFN basis. This is a model of how so-called “open regionalism” 
can work. As a result, overall tariffs have fallen sharply on trade with all countries, 
because the PTA liberalization program has been more ambitious and rapid than the 
WTO alone could have delivered. Consequently, utilization rates of remaining 
preferences have also fallen to negligible levels. Joining a new East Asian PTA 
would be a step backward, as it would bring this process of multilateralizing 
preferences to a halt.14 
 
If members of the PTA are not yet ready to give up reciprocal preferences, then 
liberalizing ROOs could be an interim step in preparing the groundwork for that 
process. This could be done by harmonization, and expanding the so-called “rules of 
cumulation” (that is, the number of countries whose value-added qualifies). If rules of 
cumulation are sufficiently expanded and then harmonized across different 
agreements, the outcome could no longer require formal multilateralization of tariff 
accords. Here again, a new and larger PTA is not required, and would in fact be a 
less desirable option. 
 
Both these alternatives could be applied to intra- and extra-regional PTAs. The 
consolidation approach, on the other hand, is only designed for intra-regional PTAs. 
But most PTAs are extra-regional. An ASEAN+3 PTA (ASEAN plus PRC, Japan, and 
Korea) would address only 6% of all PTAs of the countries concerned, while an 
ASEAN+6 PTA (ASEAN+3 plus India, Australia, and New Zealand) could potentially 
neutralize a quarter of them. But these figures in turn prompt the question as to why 
most PTAs are extra-regional to begin with? A common explanation is that they are 
designed to restore market access in traditional trading partners that may have joined 
a regional PTA (see Menon, 2007b). If this is true, then a new, consolidated East 
Asian FTA may itself spark a new wave of extra-regional PTAs. With more countries 
                                                 
14  For further discussion, see for example the exchange of views in the Far Eastern Economic Review 
between Kawai and Wignaraja (2008), and Hill and Menon (2008).  
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outside the region than inside, an East Asian PTA could actually be counter-
productive, leading perversely to an increase in the total number of PTAs. 
“Consolidation” therefore does not appear to provide a solution, and may actually 
contribute to the problem, by adding another strand to the spaghetti bowl or, worse 
still, inducing a new wave of extra-regional PTAs.  
 
4.3.  From ASEAN to the East Asian Summit, and Beyond? 
 
ASEAN has developed an elaborate set of extra-regional agreements, ranging from 
general statements about the desirability of closer economic relations to what on 
paper appears to be firm commitments to economic integration (see for example 
Plummer and Chia eds, 2009). Until around 2000, the former prevailed, and involved 
little more than official dialogues and sporadic business cooperation programs. 
However, in recent years, ASEAN has made significant commercial policy 
commitments, initially in the form of ASEAN+3 and more recently ASEAN+6. The 
latter has in turn morphed into the ASEAN Economic Community and the East Asian 
Summit15. In addition, there are various formal agreements with other economic 
communities, such as the AFTA-CER, involving ASEAN and Australia-New Zealand, 
and ASEAN+1 agreements, where ASEAN may negotiate with a particular country 
(or bloc) on a specific issue.  
     
ASEAN's regional economic integration efforts are geared toward creating an ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC). The ASEAN Leaders had originally intended to create 
the AEC by 2020, but in early 2007 they advanced the deadline to 2015. The AEC 
envisions ASEAN as a competitive economic region with a single market and 
production base. At the 13
th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 20 November 
2007, ASEAN Leaders adopted the ASEAN Economic Blueprint, to serve as a guide 
for establishing the AEC. The blueprint contains 17 “core elements” and 176 priority 
actions, to be implemented within a Strategic Schedule of four periods (2008–2009, 
2010–2011, 2012–2013, and 2014–2015). Given the diversity within ASEAN, and 
sensitivities regarding different issues\sectors, it was agreed that liberalization of 
goods, capital, and (skilled) labor flows proceed at different speeds according to 
member countries’ readiness, national policy objectives, and levels of economic and 
financial development. Thus, despite the blueprint and the various priority actions 
and schedules, it remains to be seen to what extent concrete liberalization will be 
implemented, or whether it will remain essentially a vision statement.   
 
ASEAN also participates in a range of broader regional and multilateral initiatives. 
These include APEC and WTO-based negotiations (for example, the current Doha 
Round). Its official position is that it regards these processes as consistent with 
ASEAN objectives and therefore supports them. However, in practice, ASEAN does 
not appear to have played an effective catalytic role in recent years. One ASEAN 
country, Indonesia, is a member of the G20, which appears to be morphing into the 
principal global forum for addressing key development issues, such as the measures 
to prevent a recurrence of financial crises and climate change. It is too early to judge 
whether Indonesia attempts to represent ASEAN interests at these meetings. 
Institutionally, ASEAN also has observer status at the G20. In sum, ASEAN is 
                                                 
15  Russia and the US were observers at the East Asia summit in Ha Noi on 30 October 2010, and will 
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moving cautiously and uncertainly toward being at the center of a potentially large, 
yet still undefined, economic group. 
 
Meanwhile, ASEAN has been an active participant in the ongoing, though still largely 
inconclusive, discussions concerning broader macroeconomic coordination. 
Following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, East Asia launched several interrelated 
regional cooperation initiatives, particularly for early detection and management of 
financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities, as well as broader macroeconomic 
coordination. Some of these have developed faster than others, and all have 
occurred within the framework of ASEAN+3, with the involvement of PRC, Japan and 
Korea.  
 
The three major initiatives undertaken by ASEAN+3 finance ministers are the 
introduction of a regional economic review and policy dialogue process (ASEAN+3 
ERPD); the establishment of a regional reserve pooling arrangement, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI); and the development of local-currency bond markets, the Asian Bond 
Markets Initiative (ABMI). The first two were launched in May 2000 and the latter, 
which has progressed at the slowest pace, three years later.  
The ASEAN+3 ERPD mechanism is intended to improve information sharing, 
promote dialogue among policymakers, and foster collaboration on financial, 
monetary, and fiscal issues of common interest. Initially, the CMI involved an 
expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) involving all ASEAN members, and a 
network of bilateral swap agreements (BSA) and repurchase facilities among 
ASEAN+3. The size of the CMI fund has grown from $36.5 billion in 2001–2005, to 
$84 billion in 2008, and to $120 billion in May 2009. Since its inception, however, it 
was clear that the CMI was much more than this, in that it was actually an 
institutional mechanism to pursue further negotiations, rather than a final agreement 
on swap arrangements. 
The biggest step forward took place in May 2009, when the ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers (AFMM+3) agreed on the governing mechanisms and implementation plan 
for the CMI multilateralization (CMIM). Japan and the PRC would contribute identical 
shares of the total reserve pool (32%), together with Korea (16%) and ASEAN (20%). 
The AFMM+3 also agreed to establish an ancillary institution in the form of an 
independent regional surveillance unit to monitor and analyze regional economies 
and support CMIM decision-making—the Asian Macroeconomic Research Office 
(AMRO), to commence in May 2011 in Singapore. Looking forward, the success and 
relevance of this fund will depend on boosting its size from its current $120 billion, an 
amount that is unlikely to be sufficient in the event of a major regional crisis. 
Moreover, as long as countries continue their attempts to “self-insure” in the form of 
accumulating very large (and low return) foreign exchange reserves, it is unlikely to 
play much of a role. Much will also depend on how AMRO performs, and crucial 
issues of surveillance and conditionality are operationalized. 
 
 
5.  Retrospect and Prospects 
 
Now in its fifth decade, how should one evaluate ASEAN? To what extent has it 
contributed to the region’s economic dynamism? Is it a building block or a stumbling 
block toward greater Southeast Asian and Asia-Pacific economic integration? 
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ASEAN has significant achievements to its credit. First, it still exists as an effective 
functioning entity, which is more than can be said for several other past and present 
regional organizations in the developing world. Second, for a region characterized by 
great diversity and considerable past tension, Southeast Asia has by and large been 
free of major conflict since the mid-1980s, as the three communist states 
progressively re-entered the regional and international mainstream. Of course, 
border skirmishes persist—the creation of East Timor as an independent nation state 
was a challenging experience and Myanmar remains an international pariah beyond 
the reach of ASEAN diplomacy. Third, and most important, ASEAN in aggregate has 
been a region of rapid economic development and rising living standards. One can 
debate the direction of causality between this outcome and ASEAN, but undeniably 
the determination of the region’s leaders to forge more harmonious relations has 
facilitated economic development. The engagement with and the nurturing of 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam in their early stage of economic liberalization, 
after decades of acrimony and one of the most destructive wars in recent memory, 
has been a signal achievement.  
 
Fourth, ASEAN has been diplomatically skillful in effectively playing “balance of 
power” politics (Acharya, 2009). There is no clear economic and political leadership 
in East Asia, with the economic giants of the past and future—Japan and PRC 
respectively—engaged in a battle of constant diplomatic rivalry. Courted by both 
powers, ASEAN has thus been able to advance its own interests considerably, and 
become either the arbiter or driver of almost every major initiative on regional 
commercial and security architecture. ASEAN’s pivotal position has been maintained 
as Asian regionalism has extended to embrace South Asia, and in particular the 
inclusion of the third major Asian power, India. 
 
Yet, on the other side of the ledger, ASEAN has not progressed very far in terms of 
becoming a formal economic entity. This proposition can be illustrated with reference 
to the standard theory of customs unions (Table 8). In over four decades, it has not 
progressed beyond the first phase, of loosely exchanging trade preferences, while 
still maintaining their separate, and still quite variable, trade regimes. As noted, it is 
very unlikely to progress to the next stage, of a customs union with common external 
tariffs. Deeper integration, affecting factor markets and a common macroeconomic 
policy regime a la the EU, is even further off the horizon. 
 
 
Table 8: Indicators of Economic Integration 
 
Indicator ASEAN  EU  NAFTA  CER  Mercosur 
Free trade in goods  part  yes  yes  yes  part 
Free trade in services  part  yes  part  yes  part 
Capital mobility (FDI)  part  yes  part  yes  part 
Labor mobility   no  yes  no  yes  no 
Competition law converging   no  yes  no  yes  no 
Monetary union  no  yes  no  no  no 
Unified fiscal policy   no  part  no  no  no 
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Moreover, ASEAN runs the risk of being consigned to the status of diplomatic talk-
shop. In the words of one its former Secretary Generals, in a frank report to leaders: 
“regional economic integration seems to have become stuck in framework 
agreements, work programs and master plans” (Severino, 2006, p. 247). ASEAN has 
a long history of issuing declarations, action plans and charters, yet with limited 
capacity—and in some cases arguably intention—for implementation. It has generally 
prevaricated on whether to become a formal customs union. It has developed a plan 
for labor market integration, while some of the largest labor movements in the world 
(relative to the size of the recipient economy) have occurred outside this framework. 
Even after one of the deepest economic crises in the region’s history, ASEAN was 
unable to develop a set of emergency support mechanisms. At its root, the “ASEAN 
Way” is an institutionalized mechanism that renders very unlikely the prospect of a 
fundamental change in direction. The most likely outcome is that the country’s policy 
regimes will converge over time, to the point where preferential arrangements 
become redundant. As the region’s commercial hub, Singapore sets the standard in 
this respect, and one to which the lower-income members of ASEAN might aspire. 
 
And so it is not surprising that ASEAN’s greatest achievement in the economic 
sphere has been more to do with what AFTA has indirectly induced rather than 
mandated. Recognizing that most of the region’s trade is extra-regional, in order to 
minimize the potential costs of trade diversion the original ASEAN members have 
been reducing their external tariffs in conjunction with reduced barriers to intra-
ASEAN trade. The ASEAN-6 countries have also undertaken several waves of 
multilateralizing preferences, where they have voluntarily offered their AFTA 
concessions to nonmembers on a nondiscriminatory basis. When the preferences 
are fully multilateralized, the margins of preference are zero, as is the potential for 
trade diversion. This was the case for more than two-thirds of the tariff lines for the 
ASEAN-6 countries through 2002 (Feridhanusetyawan, 2002), and the proportion 
has increased since (Menon, 2007a). 
 
Furthermore, because preferential tariff reduction schedules have been ambitious 
and rapid, AFTA has accelerated the pace of multilateral trade liberalization in 
ASEAN-6 countries. Instead of jeopardizing multilateralism, it has hastened the 
speed at which these countries have moved toward their goal of free and open trade. 
In this way, AFTA’s greatest achievement may have less to do with what it prescribes 
or mandates, and more to do with what it promotes indirectly through the long-
standing commitment of its members to openness. 
 
  





A. Acharya. 2009. Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
J. Ajanant. 1997. AFTA: An Introduction. In K.K. Hourn and S. Hunter, eds. ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement: Implications and Future Directions. London: ASEAN 
Academic Press. pp. 13–24. 
 
M. Ariff. 1991. The Malaysian Economy: Pacific Connections. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
P.C. Athukorala. 2006. Product Fragmentation and Trade Patterns in East Asia. 
Asian Economic Papers. 4 (3). pp. 1–27. 
 
———. 2006a. Trade Policy Reforms and the Structure of Protection in Viet Nam. 
The World Economy. 29 (2). pp. 161–87. 
 
P.C. Athukorala and J. Menon. 2009. Global Production Sharing, Trade Patterns and 
Determinants of Trade Flows in East Asia. ADB Working Papers on Regional 
Economic Integration. No. 41.  Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
 
J. Bhagwati. 2008. Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements 
Undermine Free Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
K. Bird,.H..Hill.and.S..Cuthbertson..2008. Making Trade Policy in a New Democracy 
after a Deep Crisis: Indonesia. The World Economy. 31 (7). pp. 947–968. 
 
D. Brooks and D. Hummels, eds. 2009. Infrastructure’s Role in Lowering Asia’s 
Trade Costs: Building for Trade. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
S.Y. Chia and M. Pangestu. 2005. Regionalism and Bilateralism in ASEAN. In S. 
Jayasuriya, ed. Trade Policy Reforms and Development: Essays in Honour of 
Peter Lloyd. Volume II. Edward Elgar. pp. 121–152. 
 
R. Edwards and K. Wong. 1996. Regional Cooperation: ASEAN, AFTA and APEC. In 
R. Edwards and M. Skully, eds. ASEAN Business, Trade and Development: 
An Australian Perspective. Butterworth-Heinemann. pp. 1–16. 
 
G. Fane. 2006. Trade Liberalization, Economic Reform and Poverty Reduction in Lao 
PDR. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy. 11 (2). pp. 213–226. 
 
T. Feridhanusetyawan. 2002. Preferential Trading Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific 
Region. IMF Working Paper. 149. Washington, DC. 
 
D. Hew, ed. 2005. Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
———. 2007. Brick by Brick: The Building of an ASEAN Economic Community. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 28          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
H. Hill and J. Menon. 2008. Back to Basics on Asian Trade. Far Eastern Economic 
Review. June. pp. 44–47. 
 
P. Imada and S. Naya, eds. 1992. AFTA: The Way Ahead. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies.  
 
D. Jarvis, S.F. Chen and T.B. Tan. 2009. Investment Liberalization in ASEAN: 
Progress, Regress or Stumbling Block? In J. Chaisse and P. Gugler, eds. 
Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia: Strategic and Policy Challenges. London: 
Routledge. pp. 138–185. 
 
M. Kawai and G. Wignaraja. 2008. A Broad Asian FTA Will Bring Big Gains. Far 
Eastern Economic Review. April. pp. 46–48. 
 
F. Kimura. 2006. International Production and Distribution Networks in East Asia: 
Eighteen Facts, Mechanics and Policy Implications. Asian Economic Policy 
Review. 1 (2). pp. 326–344. 
 
P. Lloyd. 2005. What is a Single Market? An Application to the Case of ASEAN. 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin. 22 (3). pp. 251–265. 
 
J. Menon. 2007a. Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks? The GMS and AFTA in Asia. 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin. 24 (2). pp. 254–266. 
 
———. 2007b. Bilateral Trade Agreements. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature. 21 
(2). pp. 29–47. 
 
———. 2009. Dealing with the Proliferation of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements. The 
World Economy. 32 (10). pp. 1381–1407. 
 
N. McCulloch, ed. 2009. The Rural Investment Climate in Indonesia. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  
 
M. Plummer. 2006. ASEAN Economic Development and Integration. Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing. 
 
M. Plummer and S.Y. Chia, eds. 2009. Realizing the ASEAN Economic Community: 
A Comprehensive Assessment. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies.  
 
R. Rajan and R. Sen. 2002. Liberalization of Financial Services in Southeast Asia 
under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services. CIES Discussion 
Paper. No. 0226. Centre for International Economic Studies, University of 
Adelaide.  
 
R. Sally and R. Sen, eds. 2005. Special Focus on Revisiting Trade Policies in 
Southeast Asia. ASEAN Economic Bulletin. 22 (1). Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
S-W. Saw. 1982. ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements. In S-W. Saw and H. 
Hong, eds. Growth and Direction of ASEAN Trade. Singapore: Singapore 
University Press. pp. 136–147.  
ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and the Future  |       29 
 
R. Severino. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  
 
B. Shepherd and J. Wilson. 2009. Trade Facilitation in ASEAN Member Countries: 
Measuring Progress and Assessing Priorities. Journal of Asian Economics. 20 
(4). pp. 367–383. 
 
H. Soesastro. 1999. ASEAN during the Crisis. In H. W. Arndt and H. Hill, eds. 
Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis: Origins, Lessons and the Way Forward. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 158–169. 
 
———. 2006. Regional Integration in East Asia: Achievements and Future 
Prospects. Asian Economic Policy Review. 1 (2). pp. 215–234. 
 
World Bank. 1993. The East Asian Miracle. Washington DC. 
 



































 30          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration
* 
 
1. “The ASEAN Economic Community and the European Experience” by 
Michael G. Plummer 
2. “Economic Integration in East Asia: Trends, Prospects, and a Possible 
Roadmap” by Pradumna B. Rana 
3.  “Central Asia after Fifteen Years of Transition: Growth, Regional 
Cooperation, and Policy Choices” by Malcolm Dowling and Ganeshan 
Wignaraja 
4. “Global Imbalances and the Asian Economies: Implications for Regional 
Cooperation” by Barry Eichengreen 
5.  “Toward Win-Win Regionalism in Asia: Issues and Challenges in Forming 
Efficient Trade Agreements” by Michael G. Plummer 
6. “Liberalizing Cross-Border Capital Flows: How Effective Are Institutional 
Arrangements against Crisis in Southeast Asia” by Alfred Steinherr, 
Alessandro Cisotta, Erik Klär, and Kenan Šehović 
7. “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism” by 
Richard E. Baldwin 
8. “Measuring Regional Market Integration in Developing Asia: a Dynamic 
Factor Error Correction Model (DF-ECM) Approach” by Duo Qin, Marie 
Anne Cagas, Geoffrey Ducanes, Nedelyn Magtibay-Ramos, and 
Pilipinas F. Quising 
9.  “The Post-Crisis Sequencing of Economic Integration in Asia: Trade as a 
Complement to a Monetary Future” by Michael G. Plummer and 
Ganeshan Wignaraja 
10.  “Trade Intensity and Business Cycle Synchronization: The Case of East 
Asia” by Pradumna B. Rana 
11.  “Inequality and Growth Revisited” by Robert J. Barro 
12.  “Securitization in East Asia” by Paul Lejot, Douglas Arner, and Lotte 
Schou-Zibell 
13.  “Patterns and Determinants of Cross-border Financial Asset Holdings in 
East Asia” by Jong-Wha Lee 
14.  “Regionalism as an Engine of Multilateralism: A Case for a Single East 
Asian FTA” by Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja 
15.  “The Impact of Capital Inflows on Emerging East Asian Economies: Is Too 
Much Money Chasing Too Little Good?” by Soyoung Kim and Doo Yong 
Yang  
ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and the Future  |       31 
 
16.  “Emerging East Asian Banking Systems Ten Years after the 1997/98 
Crisis” by Charles Adams 
17.  “Real and Financial Integration in East Asia” by Soyoung Kim and Jong-
Wha Lee 
18.  “Global Financial Turmoil: Impact and Challenges for Asia’s Financial 
Systems” by Jong-Wha Lee and Cyn-Young Park 
19.  “Cambodia’s Persistent Dollarization: Causes and Policy Options” by 
Jayant Menon 
20.  “Welfare Implications of International Financial Integration” by Jong-Wha 
Lee and Kwanho Shin 
21.  “Is the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA) an Optimal Free Trade 
Area?” by Donghyun Park, Innwon Park, and Gemma Esther B. Estrada 
22.  “India’s Bond Market—Developments and Challenges Ahead” by Stephen 
Wells and Lotte Schou- Zibell 
23.  “Commodity Prices and Monetary Policy in Emerging East Asia” by Hsiao 
Chink Tang 
24.  “Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?” by Jong-Wha Lee and Ju 
Hyun Pyun 
25.  “Aging in Asia: Trends, Impacts, and Responses” by Jayant Menon and 
Anna Melendez-Nakamura 
26. “Re-considering  Asian  Financial  Regionalism in the 1990s” by Shintaro 
Hamanaka 
27.  “Managing Success in Viet Nam: Macroeconomic Consequences of Large 
Capital Inflows with Limited Policy Tools” by Jayant Menon 
28.  “The Building Block Versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism: From 
the Perspective of Service Trade Liberalization in Asia” by Shintaro 
Hamanaka 
29.    “East Asian and European Economic Integration: A Comparative 
Analysis” by Giovanni Capannelli and Carlo Filippini 
30.  “Promoting Trade and Investment in India’s Northeastern Region” by M. 
Govinda Rao 
31.  “Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling” by Soyoung Kim, Jong-Wha 
Lee, and Cyn-Young Park 
32.  “India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration” by Rajiv 
Kumar and Manjeeta Singh 32          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
33.  “Developing Indicators for Regional Economic Integration and 
Cooperation” by Giovanni Capannelli, Jong-Wha Lee, and Peter Petri 
34.  “Beyond the Crisis: Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Asia” by 
Chee Sung Lee and Cyn-Young Park 
35.  “Regional Economic Impacts of Cross-Border Infrastructure: A General 
Equilibrium Application to Thailand and Lao PDR” by Peter Warr, Jayant 
Menon, and Arief Anshory Yusuf 
36.  “Exchange Rate Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Global 
Financial Crisis” by Warwick J. McKibbin and Waranya Pim Chanthapun 
37.  “Roads for Asian Integration: Measuring ADB's Contribution to the Asian 
Highway Network” by Srinivasa Madhur, Ganeshan Wignaraja,and 
Peter Darjes 
38.  “The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia” by Robert 
Rigg and Lotte Schou-Zibell 
39.  “Complements or Substitutes? Preferential and Multilateral Trade 
Liberalization at the Sectoral Level” by Mitsuyo Ando, Antoni 
Estevadeordal, and Christian Volpe Martincus 
40.  “Regulatory Reforms for Improving the Business Environment in Selected 
Asian Economies—How Monitoring and Comparative Benchmarking 
can Provide Incentive for Reform” by Lotte Schou-Zibell and Srinivasa 
Madhur 
41.  “Global Production Sharing, Trade Patterns, and Determinants of Trade 
Flows in East Asia” by Prema–Chandra Athukorala and Jayant Menon 
42.  “Regionalism Cycle in Asia (-Pacific): A Game Theory Approach to the 
Rise and Fall of Asian Regional Institutions” by Shintaro Hamanaka 
43.  “A Macroprudential Framework for Monitoring and Examining Financial 
Soundness” by Lotte Schou-Zibell, Jose Ramon Albert, and Lei Lei 
Song 
44.  “A Macroprudential Framework for the Early Detection of Banking 
Problems in Emerging Economies” by Claudio Loser, Miguel Kiguel, and 
David Mermelstein 
45.  “The 2008 Financial Crisis and Potential Output in Asia: Impact and Policy 
Implications” by Cyn-Young Park, Ruperto Majuca, and Josef Yap 
46.  “Do Hub-and-Spoke Free Trade Agreements Increase Trade? A Panel 
Data Analysis” by Jung Hur,Joseph Alba,and Donghyun Park 
47.    “Does a Leapfrogging Growth Strategy Raise Growth Rate? Some 
International Evidence” by Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, and Anna Wong  
ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and the Future  |       33 
 
48.  ―Crises  in  Asia:  Recovery  and  Policy  Responses‖  by  Kiseok  Hong  and 
Hsiao Chink Tang 
49.  ―A New Multi-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Regional Integration: 
Regional Integration Evaluation (RIE) Methodology‖ by Donghyun Park 
and Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada 
50.  ―Regional  Surveillance  for  East  Asia:  How  Can  It  Be  Designed  to 
Complement Global Surveillance?‖ by Shinji Takagi 
51.  ―Poverty  Impacts  of  Government  Expenditure  from  Natural  Resource 
Revenues‖ by Peter Warr, Jayant Menon, and Arief Anshory Yusuf 
52.  ―Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements‖ by 
David Cheong 
53.  ―The  Role  of  Membership  Rules  in  Regional  Organizations‖  by  Judith 
Kelley 
54.  ―The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia‖ by V.V. 
Desai 
55.  ―Trade  Facilitation  Measures  under  Free  Trade  Agreements:  Are  They 
Discriminatory against Non-Members?‖ by Shintaro Hamanaka, Aiken 
Tafgar, and Dorothea Lazaro 
56.  ―Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia: Regionalization or 
Globalization?‖ by Prema-chandra Athukorala 
57.  ―Global Financial Regulatory Reforms: Implications for Developing Asia‖ 
by Douglas W. Arner and Cyn-Young Park 
58.  ―Asia’s Contribution to Global Rebalancing‖ by Charles Adams, Hoe Yun 
Jeong, and Cyn-Young Park 
59.  ―Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements‖ by 
David Cheong 
60.   ―Responding to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Meeting the 
Challenges in Asia‖ by Douglas W. Arner and Lotte Schou-Zibell 
61.  ―Shaping New Regionalism in the Pacific Islands: Back to the Future?‖ by 
Satish Chand 
62.  ―Organizing the Wider East Asia Region‖ by Christopher M. Dent 
63.  ―Labour and Grassroots Civic Interests In Regional Institutions‖ by Helen 
E.S. Nesadurai 
64.  ―Institutional  Design  of  Regional  Integration:  Balancing  Delegation  and 
Representation‖ by Simon Hix  
ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and the Future  |       33 
 
48.  ―Crises  in  Asia:  Recovery  and  Policy  Responses‖  by  Kiseok  Hong  and 
Hsiao Chink Tang 
49.  ―A New Multi-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Regional Integration: 
Regional Integration Evaluation (RIE) Methodology‖ by Donghyun Park 
and Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada 
50.  ―Regional  Surveillance  for  East  Asia:  How  Can  It  Be  Designed  to 
Complement Global Surveillance?‖ by Shinji Takagi 
51.  ―Poverty  Impacts  of  Government  Expenditure  from  Natural  Resource 
Revenues‖ by Peter Warr, Jayant Menon, and Arief Anshory Yusuf 
52.  ―Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements‖ by 
David Cheong 
53.  ―The  Role  of  Membership  Rules  in  Regional  Organizations‖  by  Judith 
Kelley 
54.  ―The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia‖ by V.V. 
Desai 
55.  ―Trade  Facilitation  Measures  under  Free  Trade  Agreements:  Are  They 
Discriminatory against Non-Members?‖ by Shintaro Hamanaka, Aiken 
Tafgar, and Dorothea Lazaro 
56.  ―Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia: Regionalization or 
Globalization?‖ by Prema-chandra Athukorala 
57.  ―Global Financial Regulatory Reforms: Implications for Developing Asia‖ 
by Douglas W. Arner and Cyn-Young Park 
58.  ―Asia’s Contribution to Global Rebalancing‖ by Charles Adams, Hoe Yun 
Jeong, and Cyn-Young Park 
59.  ―Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements‖ by 
David Cheong 
60.   ―Responding to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Meeting the 
Challenges in Asia‖ by Douglas W. Arner and Lotte Schou-Zibell 
61.  ―Shaping New Regionalism in the Pacific Islands: Back to the Future?‖ by 
Satish Chand 
62.  ―Organizing the Wider East Asia Region‖ by Christopher M. Dent 
63.  ―Labour and Grassroots Civic Interests In Regional Institutions‖ by Helen 
E.S. Nesadurai 
64.  ―Institutional  Design  of  Regional  Integration:  Balancing  Delegation  and 
Representation‖ by Simon Hix 34          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 69 
 
65.  ―Regional  Judicial  Institutions  and  Economic  Cooperation:  Lessons  for 
Asia?‖ by Erik Voeten 
66.  "The Awakening Chinese Economy: Macro and Terms of. Trade Impacts 
on  10  Major  Asia-Pacific  Countries"  by  Yin  Hua  Mai,  Philip  Adams, 
Peter Dixon, and Jayant Menon 
67.   ―Institutional Parameters of a Region-Wide Economic Agreement in Asia: 
Examination  of  Trans-Pacific  Partnership  and  ASEAN+α  Free  Trade 
Agreement Approaches‖ by Shintaro Hamanaka 
68.  ―Evolving Asian Power Balances and Alternate Conceptions for Building 
Regional Institutions‖ by Yong Wang 
* These papers can be downloaded from: (ARIC) http://aric.adb.org/reipapers/ or (ADB)         
http://adb.org/Economics/publications.asp?fs=fm_9:999 
 
    ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and the Future
Established in 1967, ASEAN is arguably the most durable and successful regional grouping in 
the developing world. Despite great internal diversity and a reluctance to establish a strong 
supranational structure, its economic agenda has grown from liberalization of merchandise 
trade to include services, investment, and labor. More recently through ASEAN+3, it has 
broadened cooperation to macroeconomic surveillance and financial issues. Nevertheless, 
there is little likelihood in the foreseeable future that this will evolve into a deep EU-style 
economic integration behind a common external trade regime, despite a commitment to 
forming an ASEAN Economic Community beginning 2015.
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